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ABSTRACT 
 
Vasarhelyi and Zheng (2013) report that more than 4,000 filing errors have been reported in 
XBRL interactive data following the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2009 interactive 
data reporting mandate.   Alles and Gray (2012) report that demand exists for externally provided 
assurance of XBRL filings if the cost of assurance appears less significant to clients.  While the 
discussion of assurance on XBRL filings generally addresses management’s confidence in the 
accuracy assurance on financial data, a void in the literature exists regarding auditor 
independence in the provision of assurance on XBRL-generated nonfinancial information.  
Further, Pinsker and Wheeler (2009) note that limited business knowledge (LBK, hereafter) 
investors’ perceptions of – and reactions to – assurance services have not been fully examined.  
The results of the present research indicate that LBK investors may be more tolerant of a 
nonindependent attestation on XBRL nonfinancial data with respect to their long-term 
investments, but not necessarily for their short-term investments.  In addition, companies that 
provide assurance on voluntarily reported nonfinancial information may feel a level of comfort in 
the fact that LBK investors do not feel that they would win a lawsuit against the company for a 
mistake in this information.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, hereafter) recently examined the 
current state of business reporting and assurance to identify key forces of change and limitations that 
the profession must overcome in order to better address the needs of financial statement users in the 
21
st
 century (Pawlicki 2008).  The AICPA specifically states that the accounting profession must modernize its 
reporting model and address the need for timelier reporting and new audit strategies (Pawlicki 2008, 4).  The report 
also singles out advances in technology and market reactions as the top issues driving the change in reporting and 
assurance models.   
 
The current research examines limited knowledge investors’ (LBK investors, hereafter) perception of 
continuous assurance on a company’s voluntary, XBRL-generated nonfinancial disclosures.1  This study is 
                                                 
1 The AICPA’s Special Committee on Assurance Services (hereafter SCAS) defines assurance services as “independent professional services that 
improve the quality of information, or its context, for decision makers (Alles et al. 2002).”  SCAS claims that the scope of assurance services 
involves any type of information (financial or nonfinancial), and that “the goal of assurance services is information improvement, not the issuance 
of a report on it” (although an assurance report may be issued through a contractual agreement).  Hunton et al. (2004) states that the term 
continuous means that “assurance is provided ‘in real time’ as information is generated or updated, or aggregated at intervals less frequently than 
quarterly or annually generated data.” The present study employs Hunton et al.’s (2004) definition of assurance, which operationalizes assurance 
as “assurance that is attached to full or partial financial information releases.” 
T 
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motivated by Pinsker and Wheeler (2009, 46), who suggest future research as to whether a stronger form of 
expanded assurance positively affects LBK investors’ investment decisions.  The study also answers their call for 
future research regarding the value of expanded assurance. 
 
Pinsker and Wheeler (2009; hereafter PW 2009) define LBK investors as those with limited business 
knowledge and experience about current business practices and business-related IT services.  Research suggests that 
LBK investors’ perceptions of and reactions to assurance services have not been fully examined, as this group has 
only recently been identified as a subset of less sophisticated investors.   
 
The present study specifically focuses on LBK investors for two reasons.  First, extant literature reveals the 
need for researchers to decompose nonprofessional individual investors into subgroups, since each group has a 
different level of accounting knowledge (Elliot et al. 2007; Ackert and Church 2001; Hunton and McEwen 1997).  
 
Second, LBK investors are important because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 stresses the need to protect 
investors who do not have the necessary knowledge to protect themselves.  Pawlicki (2008, 13) suggests that there 
has been an increase in new investors, by way of those who participate in their 401(k) plans.  Regrettably, LBK 
investors tend to lack formal accounting training, which makes them more apt to misunderstand or ignore 
knowledge associated with current business practices and related information technology.  Therefore, it is important 
that accounting regulators understand LBK investors’ determinants of demand for continuous assurance in order to 
assist them in their investment decisions. 
 
It is unknown, however, whether LBK investors are willing to pay a premium for assurance services not 
required on voluntarily reported disclosures in XBRL.  Further, it is unknown whether continuous assurance 
providers’ level of independence would affect their decision to purchase assurance for non-regulated nonfinancial 
assurance.  Bhattacharya et al. (2007) find that less sophisticated investors are more vulnerable than sophisticated 
investors to be deceived by misleading, unaudited proforma earnings information.  Thus, this research addresses 
LBK investors’ perceptions of the credibility of the assurance provided by the following sources: a company’s 
voluntarily reported, XBRL-generated nonfinancial disclosures: management-provided assurance (i.e. no external 
assurance), continuous controls monitoring, or an independent auditor. 
 
The results of this research indicate that LBK investors may be more tolerant of a non-independent 
continuous assurance arrangement for their long-term investments, but not necessarily for their short-term 
investments.  In addition, LBK investors are not convinced that they would win a lawsuit in which they suffer losses 
a company’s honest mistake from their voluntary continuous reporting system.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a review of the background 
and hypotheses.  The following section discusses the methodology.  The research concludes with a discussion of the 
results, followed by the conclusion. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
  
Alles et al. (2002) suggest that three components are essential to effective provision of assurance services: 
(1) capturing information by the assuree, (2) monitoring and analyzing information by the assuror to ensure the 
reliability of the information, and (3) communicating the outcome of the assurance engagement by the assuror.  This 
study focuses on the third component of assurance (communication) for the following reasons.   
 
First, communication must come from a reliable source in order for the information to be useful to the 
investor.  Investors who perceive information bias when management communicates information about their own 
company tend to penalize the company by lowering the stock prices for unreliable information (Miller 2002).  
However, when information is reliable, stock prices tend to more accurately reflect investors’ perceived value of a 
company (King et al. 1990; Olsen 1997).  Hence, this research examines LBK investors’ perceptions of the 
credibility of various continuous assurance providers. 
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A second reason for focusing on the communication of assurance is that the credibility of a continuous 
assurance provider reduces both information risk and stock price volatility.  Alles et al. (2002) invoke that 
independent assurance may not be necessary in certain situations where management’s signals alone are sufficiently 
reliable. 
 
A third reason for studying the communication of assurance is to understand factors that increase the 
demand for continuous assurance.  Alles et al. (2002) assert that investors’ demand for continuous assurance may be 
a key driver of continuous assurance.  For these reasons, the current research examines LBK investors’ determinants 
of demand for continuous assurance on XBRL-generated nonfinancial information. 
 
Management Credibility 
 
Auditing research finds that investors compensate for their uncertainty regarding management’s bias in 
reporting, especially in the absence of independent assurance (Boylan 2000; Dopuch and King 1991; Hasan et al. 
2003; Hovland et al. 1953).  Investors are assumed to asign varying degrees of credibility to information based on 
two factors: (1) the source (or provider) of the information, and (2) based on whether the purported information is 
positive or negative (i.e. the direction of the information).  While required financial statement information and 
mandatory financial statement disclosures are regulated by accounting standards, voluntarily-reported nonfinancial 
information is not subject to SEC regulations. This may adversely affect investors’ perceptions of the credibility of 
nonfinancial information in the absence of an independent assurance provider.   
 
Multiple research streams have examined the issue of management credibility using psychology research.  
Williams (1996) and Hirst et al. (1999) find that management credibility is a significant factor in assessing the 
credibility of a firm’s financial disclosures, while Healy and Wahlen (1999) find that management’s credibility may 
be affected by incentives to disclose information in the most positive manner.  Other studies find investors’ 
perceptions of financial statement reliability decrease in the presence of certain management compensation 
structures; their perception of information risk is reflected in stock price volatility (Hirst et al. 1999; King et al. 
1990; Masters 1989; Miller 2002; Olsen 1997, Pinsker and Wheeler 2009).  Consistent with prior research (Akerlof 
1970), these findings suggest that LBK investors may penalize management’s assertions regarding negative 
information disclosures if it is suspected that management may not be as forthcoming in their disclosure information 
as a result of incentives to present the negative information in a more positive light.  
 
In addition to psychology research, Hunton et al. (2008) find that earnings management behavior is reduced 
with continuous monitoring, compared to periodic monitoring in the presence of short-term incentives. They also 
find that more frequent monitoring significantly decreases the willingness of managers to continue to use a risky but 
viable project. 
 
A company’s continuous reporting system provides investors with nonfinancial information that is not 
subject to regulation. Even though this information is not regulated, two mechanisms – continuous controls 
monitoring and continuous assurance – may positively influence investors’ perceptions of the credibility associated 
with management’s voluntary reporting of continuously reported data. 
 
Management’s Provision of Continuous Controls Monitoring 
 
Continuous controls monitoring (CCM, hereafter) is designed to track financial and nonfinancial 
information that flows through a company’s information system.  Continuous controls monitoring differs from 
continuous assurance.  Continuous assurance is designed to improve the quality of information by providing 
assurance about the information “in real time” as information is generated or updated.  Continuous controls 
monitoring is an approach to ensuring that the financial information generated by publicly traded companies meet 
the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
 
Investors’ perceptions of management’s assertions about continuous reporting information may be 
improved in the presence of CCM.  When effective, CCM provides external auditors, internal auditors, and 
corporate managers with real-time status assurances for all of managements’ compliance control points, and alerts 
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these user groups of material events and other occurrences (Hunton et al. 2008).  In addition, CCM may be used to 
drive significant business improvement, since it is a tool for ensuring that critical business processes are being 
executed and ethically adhered to (Huffman and Crump 2005).   
 
PWC (2006) finds that 81 percent of organizations reported that their internal auditors have either 
implemented or plan to implement continuous monitoring.  While CCM can be used to monitor a company’s 
processes that generate continuous reporting information at all times, the following limitations are associated with 
CCM systems: (1) lack of timeliness, (2) the extent of information given by the system, and (3) and inability to 
check all control points (Huffman and Crump 2005).
2
   In addition to these limitations, management may view their 
company’s internal audit function as a means of achieving operational goals and generating cost savings 
(Hermanson and Rittenberg 2003).  These limitations may cause investors to be leery of trusting a CCM system that 
is run by the company’s internal audit department. 
 
Independent Assurance 
 
Extant literature finds that the presence of certified public accountants positively affects a firm’s value 
(Simunic and Stein 1987; Slovin et al. 1990), and that investors highly value CPA audits as a credible source of 
information (Dopuch and King 1991; Boylan 2000; Hasan et al. 2003; Pany and Smith 1982; Hodge 2001).  PW 
(2009) find that an independent CPA review engagement significantly increases LBK investors’ perceptions of stock 
value.  They also find that stock prices increase significantly when positive nonfinancial information disclosures are 
provided by an independent CPA review engagement, which is consistent with psychology research (Birnbaum and 
Stegner 1979).  In addition, their research finds that expanded assurance decreases stock price variance when 
negative nonfinancial information is disclosed.   
 
Continuous Assurance Hypothesis 
 
Two conflicting lines of reasoning exist regarding whether a provider of continuous assurance on 
continuous reporting information should be independent.  The traditional line of reasoning – which is supported by 
prior literature – is that independence is essential to the reliability of work performed in an attest engagement.  
 
Taylor et al. (2003) propose a second line of reasoning as they set forth their argument for a new 
framework that emphasizes financial statement reliability.  They hypothesize that independence (and expertise) 
underlies a CPAs pursuit of objectivity, which leads to useful, reliable financial statements.   
 
The present research hypothesizes that Taylor et al.’s (2003) second line of reasoning is more in line with 
LBK investors’ preference for continuous provided assurance.  LBK investors – similar to small businesses – are not 
as astute about accounting practices as are their more sophisticated counterparts.  While it is possible that both LBK 
investors and non-SEC companies may believe that a CPA can provide an objective review while not being 
independent, their more sophisticated investors (CPAs and SEC companies) have different opinions.  However, 
financial statement users expect CPAs to exhibit a high level of integrity, even in the midst of recent accounting 
scandals, thus leading to better quality continuous reporting information resulting from a non-independent review 
engagement.  The following hypothesis presents this line of reasoning, as follows:  
 
H1: LBK investors’ confidence in continuously reported, XBRL-generated, nonfinancial information increases 
when continuous assurance is provided by a non-independent CPA review engagement. 
 
Continuous Assurance Demand Hypothesis 
 
Hunton et al. (2004) assert that value is attached to accounting behavioral researchers who explore how 
continuous assurance may improve decision quality with more frequent reporting.  They also note that “researchers 
know little about the perceived incremental value of continuous assurance in the context of more frequent financial 
                                                 
2 Future research may focus on strategies to overcome these limitations and how this increases the credibility of CCM. 
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reporting.”  Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) and Mercer (2004) find that disclosure source is only one factor in the 
decision process.   
 
This research contributes to the literature stream by modeling LBK investors’ determinants of their demand 
for purchasing continuous assurance.  The following research question addresses this concern.   
 
H2: What are LBK investors’ determinants of demand for an investor to be willing to purchase continuous 
assurance on a company’s continuously-reported, voluntary nonfinancial information?   
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
 
The selection of participants for this study is consistent with PW (2009) and Ackert and Church (2001), 
who use liberal arts students as a proxy for non-business individuals.  This group is a proxy for LBK investors, who 
are nonprofessional investors with a limited background in business and/or accounting, and who are purchasing (or 
someday may purchase) common stock securities.  Participants are randomly selected senior liberal arts students.     
 
Procedures and Statistical Methods 
 
Participants are asked to complete a survey consisting of twenty-two closed-ended statements in order to 
understand LBK investors’ determinants of demand for continuous assurance on continuously reported information.  
Participants are asked to assess each using a 5-point Likert Scale, anchored at 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly 
agree.  Factor analysis is an appropriate technique that may be used to determine whether information can be 
condensed or summarized in a smaller set of factors or components. In addition, it is an appropriate technique that 
can be used to examine the underlying relationships for a large number of variables.  Appendix A summarize the 
participants' responses to each of the survey items. 
 
IV. RESULTS3 
 
Factor Analysis 
 
 An analysis of the eigenvalues reveals that six eigenvalues over one are eligible to be retained as factors, 
which represent approximately 77.532% of the variables retained in the factor.  After rotating the sum of squared 
loadings and their related factor loadings, three factors are retained for analysis, which represent 65.59% of the 
variables retained in the factor.   
 
Table 1 exhibits variables with significant loadings on the three factors retained in the study.  Loadings 
greater than 0.40 are considered as significant loadings for purpose of this study.  The variables are sorted by their 
loadings on each factor.  A marked pattern of variables with high loadings for each factor is evident.  The loadings 
for factor one range from 0.561 to 0.896.  The two loadings for factor two range from 0.856 to 0.866.  The loadings 
for factor three range from 0.512 to 0.787.    
 
Table 1: Factor Composition 
 Factor Name Survey Questions 
Factor 1 Preferred Assurance Provider 6, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 
Factor 2 Usefulness of Assurance to Investor 9, 19 
Factor 3 Propensity of Investor to Litigate for Losses 2, 7, 10 
 
  
                                                 
3 Unless noted otherwise –  scale responses of four and five are collectively referred to as “agree” responses, and  responses of one and two are 
referred to as “fail to agree” responses for the remainder of the paper. 
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Analysis of the Participants’ Responses to the Factors 
 
This section discusses limited business knowledge investors’ responses to the statements in the survey 
retained in factors one, two and three.  Prior to discussing the participants’ responses to the survey questions that 
comprise each factor, a chi-squared test is incorporated to measure whether LBK investors perceive a difference 
between assurance offered by an audit and a review engagement.  Consistent with expectations, participants do not 
perceive a significant difference between the assurance offered by a review and an audit engagement at the 0.05 
level of significance (p = 0.083).  This result is expected, and confirms that LBK investors have a minimal 
knowledge of accounting practices and the range of services provided by CPAs.   
 
Factor One - Preferred Assurance Provider 
 
Factor One measures LBK investors’ preference of the level of independence associated with the assurance 
provider who opines on a company's voluntarily reported nonfinancial information.  Each of the survey items have 
squared loadings greater than 0.70, which indicates that more than 50% of the variance in the original variables is 
explained by the factor. 
 
Overall, more participants fail to agree (69.9%) than agree (30.1%) that they would hire the same CPA firm 
to design and review a company’s continuous reporting system and to perform their financial statement audit 
(survey item 11).  When asked to respond to this same question with respect to a company in which participants 
would invest their retirement income, participants responses to survey item 12 exhibit a fairly normal distribution.  
However, more participants fail to agree (66.6%) than agree (33.4%) that this assurance arrangement is suitable for a 
company in which they invest their disposable income (survey item 13).   Finally, approximately 53.6% of 
participants agree that a company’s management team can review their own continuous reporting system as 
effectively as an outside CPA Firm, compared to 43.4% of participants that fail to agree (survey item 16).   
 
 Survey items 6 and 15 also address investors’ preferences of the provision of assurance on voluntarily 
reported nonfinancial information.  Thirty percent (30.0%) of the participants (30.0%) indicate that they would use a 
company’s voluntarily reported nonfinancial information, regardless of whether the information is assured (survey 
item 6).  Approximately forty-three percent (43.3%) of the participants in survey item 15 agree that they their 
decision to purchase continuous assurance depends on whether they invest in a large or small company.  
Collectively, these results indicate that both small- and large-size companies should consider using some form of 
assurance to validate any voluntarily reported nonfinancial information that they communicate to the investors. 
 
 In summary, the results from factor one suggest that LBK investors’ preference as to whether a 
nonindependent CPA should provide continuous assurance on a company’s voluntarily reported nonfinancial 
information depends on the type of investment undertaken by the investor.  LBK investors may be more tolerant of 
this type of assurance arrangement for their long-term investments, but not necessarily for their short-term 
investments.  Also, LBK investors appear to believe that management may be in a better position to review the 
quality of their own continuous monitoring system than an outside accounting firm.  Investigations as to why LBK 
investors do not strongly prefer an independent CPA is an area for future research. 
 
Factor Two - Usefulness of Assurance to Investor 
 
Factor Two addresses the usefulness of continuous assurance to investors.  Participants’ response to survey 
item 9 suggests that more participants agree (60.0%) than fail to agree (40.0%) that assurance on a company’s 
nonfinancial information is useful in their investment decisions, regardless of whether a CPA who provides this 
assurance is independent.  In addition, an overwhelming majority of the participants (83.3%) indicate that they 
would desire more frequent assurance on the quality of a company’s nonfinancial information for companies in 
which they invest their short-term profits (survey item 19). 
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Factor Three - Propensity of Investor to Litigate for Losses 
 
 Factor Three addresses LBK investors’ perceptions of their propensity to sue a client for mistakes in their 
voluntarily reported information.  An overwhelming majority of participants (80.0%) indicate in survey item 2 that 
their investment decisions would be better if a company voluntarily provides them with nonfinancial reporting 
information, even if that information is not subject to review by a CPA.  Strikingly, almost 60% of LBK investors do 
not expect to win a lawsuit against a company if they incur financial harm as a result of this voluntarily reported 
information (survey item 7).  These results are particularly mystifying in light of the fact 56.6% of the participants 
indicate that they would possibly file a suit against a company if they incur financial harm as a result of a company’s 
required financial statement disclosures (survey item 10).   
 
These results suggest that a firm may be more apt to consider investing in a continuous reporting 
information system that provides voluntarily reported nonfinancial information to investors.   However, this may be 
of concern to accounting regulators, who may be compelled to provide regulation to prohibit firms from managing 
their disclosures by closing loopholes that may allow firms to shift some of their required financial statement 
disclosures to their voluntary nonfinancial information disclosures.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 This study examines limited knowledge investors’ perceptions of the provision of continuous assurance on 
a company’s voluntary, XBRL-generated nonfinancial disclosures.  Extant research identifies the need to understand 
LBK investors’ determinants of expanded assurance on voluntarily reported XBRL-generated nonfinancial 
information.  The results of this study reveal two very important findings.  First, LBK investors’ desire voluntarily 
reported nonfinancial information to assist them in their investment decision making.  While the generalizability of 
the results to other investor groups may be limited, the implications suggest that companies may feel a level of 
comfort knowing that LBK investors do not feel that they would win a lawsuit against the company for a mistake in 
their voluntarily reported information.   
 
Secondly, LBK investors do not find it appropriate for the same CPA firm to design and review a 
company’s continuous reporting system if the CPA firm also audits the company’s financial statements.  
Specifically, LBK investors do not believe that the provision of nonindependent assurance on a company’s 
voluntarily-reported nonfinancial information will improve the quality of their investments with respect to their 
disposable income.  These findings do not support Taylor et al.’s (2003) reliability framework.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Views Regarding An Investor's Needs For Assurance Services On Voluntarily Reported Non-Financial Information 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1.   There is not a major difference between a 
review or audit engagement. 1 
2.9231 1.0926 10.3% 20.7% 31.0% 34.5% 3.4% 
2    As a future (or current) investor, I feel as if 
my investment decisions would be better if 
companies would provide me with voluntary 
nonfinancial information, even if that 
information is not audited or required by 
regulation. 
4.0370 1.0184 3.3% 3.3% 13.3% 40.0% 40.0% 
3.   I feel as if a company's voluntarily reported 
non-financial information would be more 
useful to me if the quality of the information 
is verified by an assurance service, even if the 
company's has only received unqualified 
audit reports. 1 
4.1154 0.6528 - - 13.8% 58.6% 27.6% 
4.   I would take risks with my retirement money 
if there were a 50% chance of a big payday. 1 
2.4444 1.0860 16.7% 40.0% 23.3% 13.3% 6.7% 
5.   I would take risks with my "extra" money if 
there were a 50% chance of a big payday. 1 
3.8462 0.6748  3.4% 20.7% 62.1% 13.8% 
6.   I would purchase a company's voluntarily 
reported non-financial information to assist 
me in my financial decision making even if it 
is not subject to the same regulatory process 
as the "regular" financial statement 
information. 
2.8889 1.1209 16.7% 16.7% 36.7% 26.7% 3.3% 
7.   I would expect to win a lawsuit against a 
company that makes an honest mistake when 
the company voluntarily reports non-financial 
information that is not required in the 
financial statements. 
3.1111 1.1209 10.0% 23.3% 26.7% 33.3% 6.7% 
8.   One CPA designs a company's voluntary 
nonfinancial reporting system and reviews 
the quality of the system; the other CPA only 
reviews the system's reporting quality.  Both 
CPAs have an equal chance of losing a 
lawsuit if the company commits fraud. 1 
3.4815 0.9352 - 20.0% 20.0% 50.0% 10.0% 
9.   In reference to previous question, I believe 
that either CPA firm that provides assurance 
is equally valuable to me in helping me make 
investment decisions. 
3.7778 0.8006 - 3.3% 36.7% 40.0% 20.0% 
10. I WILL sue a company if their mandatory, 
regulated disclosures include a mistake. 
3.4815 0.9755 3.3% 10.0% 30.0% 43.3% 13.3% 
11. I am willing to hire the same CPA firm that 
designs the company's voluntary reporting 
system to (1) authenticate the quality of that 
system and (2) to audit that company's 
financial statements. 
2.9259 1.0350 3.3% 33.3% 33.3% 23.3% 6.7% 
12. For a company in which I invest my 
"retirement money" it just makes sense that 
the same CPA firm that designs the 
company's voluntary reporting system to (1) 
authenticate the quality of that system and (2) 
to audit that company's financial statements. 
2.8519 1.2620 13.3% 26.7% 26.7% 23.3% 10.0% 
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(Appendix A continued) 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
13. For a company in which I invest my 
"disposable income" it just makes sense that 
the same CPA firm that designs the 
company's voluntary reporting system to (1) 
authenticate the quality of that system and 
(2) to audit that company's financial 
statements. 
2.8148 1.1779 10.0% 33.3% 23.3% 26.7% 6.7% 
14. My decision to require a CPA to verify the 
quality of a company's voluntarily reported 
nonfinancial information would depend on 
whether I invest a small or large amount of 
money. 1 
3.1111 1.2195 6.7% 30.0% 16.7% 33.3% 13.3% 
15. My decision to require a CPA to verify the 
quality of a company's voluntarily reported 
nonfinancial information would depend on 
whether I invest in a large company or a 
smaller company. 
3.0000 1.2089 10.0% 26.7% 20.0% 33.3% 10.0% 
16. I am confident that a company whose 
management team rigorously evaluates the 
authenticity of their voluntarily reported 
nonfinancial information is as effective as if 
an outside CPA Firm provides the same 
service. 
3.3333 1.0000 3.3% 20.0% 20.0% 53.3% 3.3% 
17. My perception of a company's voluntarily 
reported nonfinancial information would be 
enhanced if the quality of the information is 
verified by a CPA who only performs an 
audit for companies where I have retirement 
stock.1 
3.0370 1.0554 3.3% 26.7% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% 
18. My perception of a company's voluntarily 
reported nonfinancial information would be 
enhanced if the quality of the information is 
verified by a CPA who only performs an 
audit for companies where I engage in day-
trading activities. 1 
3.1111 0.9740 3.3% 16.7% 53.3% 16.7% 10.0% 
19. If I am investing my money for short term 
profits, I would like to have more frequent 
assurance of the accuracy of the financial 
and nonfinancial information of a company 
in which I invest. 1 
4.0370 0.5175 - - 16.7% 70.0% 13.3% 
20. Companies who are mandated to provide 
more frequent financial information will not 
be as likely to commit accounting fraud. 1 
3.5185 1.2207 6.7% 10.0% 33.3% 26.7% 23.3% 
21. I consider myself a beginner investor.1, 2 4.0741 1.0715  13.3% 13.3% 33.3% 40.0% 
22. I consider myself a professional investor. 1, 2 2.0000 1.3009 43.3% 26.7% 10.0% 13.3% 6.7% 
1 Denotes that this item was not included in either of the three factors 
2 These items served as a manipulation check to ensure that participants paid close attention to the items in the survey. 
Participants who recorded the same answer for each question were removed from the statistical analysis. 
Note: The sum of Likert Scale percentage may not equal 100.0% due to rounding.  All mean and standard deviations are 
rounded to four decimal places. 
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